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In this essay, I critique science diplomacy discourse generated by 
President Obama’s “New Beginning” speech at Cairo University on 
June 4, 2009. The speech launched the Cairo Agenda, a program of 
action in education, science, technology, and innovation to build 
trust between Muslim-majority countries and the United States, 
and committed the Administration to enhance science diplomacy 
programs. My critique sets the Cairo Agenda discourses in the 
context of science diplomacy, considered as a relational strategy to 
open doors and bridge national and cultural divides.  
The public sphere provides a theoretical grounding for my 
critique. For this purpose, I consider the public sphere a discursive 
space for informational and cultural exchange in which participants 
work out what can and ought to be done to effectuate change and 
direct processes of globalization through dialogue, engagement, and 
enacted values. In this particular critique, I am less concerned with 
the legitimation processes of media, public opinion, and 
institutions, although I acknowledge that this dynamic remains at 
the core of public sphere scholarship and continues to demand 
critical evaluation. My critique reflects a different objective, in 
which the public sphere serves as a framework for assessing and 
deepening cross-cultural dialogue. I privilege the active arguments 
taking place among members of a rhetorical community about 
issues of public concern, which may or may not become visible to 
those outside that community. Quoting Marc Lynch, “These 
dialogues require media that can bring arguments before a relevant 
audience, but media alone do not a public sphere make” (Lynch, 
2006, 32). 
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This perspective elucidates how individuals join public debate as 
diverse participants rather than as the disembodied voice of the 
universal citizen (Asen, 1999, 115). Engagement occurs in contexts 
of varying structure, scope, and formality. More than the 
transmittal of information and beliefs, discourse functions as a 
constitutive force. Robert Asen called this discursive process 
“collective imagining” (Asen, 2002, 349). Collective imagining 
occurs in the background, coalescing and marshaling the shared 
assumptions, values, perceptions, and beliefs that guide individuals’ 
accounts on issues of public concern (Asen, 2002, 351). 
I contend that the Cairo Agenda sparked parallel dialogues 
carried out in two separate loci of discourse: the public sphere 
through which Obama Administration officials and science envoys 
promoted the Cairo Agenda to Muslim audiences, and in which 
their counterparts representing Muslim-majority countries or 
organizations responded in kind; and the reticulate, performative 
public sphere in which Muslim scientists engaged each other in 
conversation, agitating for change. Gerard Hauser’s description of 
the public sphere as “a web of discursive arenas, spread across 
society and even in some cases across national boundaries” is 
especially apt (Hauser, 1999, 71). Hauser attributes to the public 
sphere an “associative network,” in which “actual practices form a 
lattice of discursive spaces with permeable boundaries” and that 
works best when boundaries not only permit but also welcome 
“border crossings” by interests and actors from other arenas 
(Hauser, 1999, 72). My critique explores the quality and substance 
of the Cairo Agenda-inspired border crossings between Obama 
Administration representatives and their interlocutors, and the 
community of self-identified Muslim scientists and their advocates. 
My methodological approach relies on narrative critique, 
drawing from three sites of discourse. One set of discourses is 
comprised of public statements about the Science Envoys program 
and by the Science Envoys themselves, gathered through searches 
of U.S. Department of State and Bureau of International 
Information Program archives. Thirteen individuals have served in 
this volunteer capacity since the Program’s inception. Four of the 
envoys were announced in January 2015; their remarks fall outside 
the scope of this particular critique. 
Public statements of U.S. State Department and USAID officials 
likewise engaged in science diplomacy initiatives compose the 
second set of discourses, obtained from online archives. Third, I 
gathered public statements and opinion from non-governmental 
and civil society actors, including scientists acting in a private or 
non-governmental capacity. To access these discourses, I focused 
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primarily on the archives of SciDev.Net, Muslim-Science.Com, and 
the AAAS Center for Science & Diplomacy. In each case, I 
supplemented searches of specific archives with broad-based search 
strategies, including LexisNexis, Google Search, and news 
aggregators such as EurekAlert. 
In the section that follows, I introduce science diplomacy’s value 
as a strategy for cross-cultural engagement, present the narrative 
framing of science diplomacy that arose at the end of the Cold War, 
and set forth a number of premises about science diplomacy that 
underpin my critique. I then illustrate and comment on the 
dialogues taking place within the Cairo Agenda and Muslim science 
arenas. I conclude with observations and recommendations to build 
and strengthen the lattice work between these official and reticulate 
public spheres, and about prospects for creating a cross-cultural 
ethos to guide the purposes and practices of science. 
STILL RELEVANT AFTER ALL THESE YEARS: 
SCIENCE DIPLOMACY’S POST-COLD WAR 
EVOLUTION 
To establish the context for current day science diplomacy, we need 
to start with the revisioning process that occurred following the end 
of the Cold War. Science diplomacy played a critical role in 
maintaining the status quo and building bridges of understanding 
between Cold War adversaries. As Vaughn Turekian and Norm 
Neureiter wrote in the inaugural issue of Science & Diplomacy, “In 
many ways, the Cold War was a time of highly effective use of 
science diplomacy to build bridges and connections despite the 
existence of great political tensions” (Turekian and Neureiter, 2012, 
1). In the post-Cold War period, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
globalization, and transnational threats had a disquieting effect on 
the purposes and benefits of science diplomacy. Globalization 
magnified the effects of post-Cold War aftershocks, challenging the 
compartmentalized, nation-state-centric understanding of the 
international order. In this changing context, the ampersand in 
science and diplomacy began losing its grip in both domains. 
(Turekian et al., 2015, 11-12). 
The resulting ambiguity gave rise to divergent and contested 
meanings for science diplomacy, making it more rather than less 
difficult for diplomats and scientists to find common ground and 
common cause. In February 2009, Gordon Brown, then Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom, issued a call to revitalize science 
diplomacy: 
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Many of the challenges we face today are international 
and—whether its tackling climate change or fighting 
disease—these global problems require global solutions. 
… That is why it is important that we create a new role 
for science in international policy-making and 
diplomacy … to place science at the heart of the 
progressive international agenda (The Royal Society, 
2010, v). 
In response, the Royal Society and the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS) co-convened “New Frontiers in 
Science Diplomacy” on June 1-2, 2009. Almost 200 delegates from 
20 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and North 
and South America participated in their roles as government 
officials and diplomats, scientists, policy makers, business leaders, 
and journalists. 
The conference report, New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy: 
Navigating the Changing Balance of Power, established a 
definitional framework that permeates discussion among scholars 
and governmental officials. The framework, explained in detail in 
Science Diplomacy: New Day or False Dawn? has three 
dimensions (Davis and Patman, 2015). One is science in diplomacy, 
which aims to inform foreign policy objectives with scientific 
advice. A second dimension is diplomacy for science, which 
facilitates international science cooperation. Science for diplomacy 
is a third dimension, whose purpose is to use science cooperation to 
improve international relations between countries. The authors of 
New Frontiers associate science for diplomacy with the soft power 
of science that encompasses cooperative agreements, institution-
building, negotiation, people-to-people exchange, and cultural 
diplomacy (The Royal Society, 2010, 12-13). 
The New Frontiers report set forth an agenda of issues that defy 
unilateral solutions and require nation-states to promote and 
protect their interests through cooperation, reciprocity as 
distinguished from quid pro quo transactions, and shared 
advantage (Nye, 1990b, 158). Quoting Chatham House’s Bernice 
Lee: 
Environmental threats are adding to the complexity of 
international relations in an already turbulent world. 
The anticipated bottlenecks and constraints—in food, 
water, energy and other critical natural resources and 
infrastructure—are bringing new geophysical, political 
and economic challenges, and creating new and hard-to-
manage instabilities (The Royal Society, 2010, 5). 
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New Frontiers associates these transboundary and global threats 
with science in diplomacy, emphasizing scientists’ role in building 
and communicating an evidence base and providing independent 
advice to foreign policy decision-makers. By contrast, following the 
logic set forth in New Frontiers, science diplomacy’s effectiveness is 
determined by the degree to which cooperation repairs or 
strengthens nation-state relations independently of achieving 
international development and sustainability goals. 
Science for diplomacy optimizes the attractive and universal 
qualities of scientific endeavor (Turekian et al., 2015, 18). The 
attractiveness of the United States’ institutions of learning and 
achievements in science and technology supports the inference that 
science diplomacy can convey if not also generate influence. 
Quoting Ahmed Zewail, one of the first science envoys appointed 
under the Cairo Agenda’s auspices, America is “a magnet for many 
members of my generation because of its leadership in science and 
technology and its unique democratic values” (Zewail, 2011). 
New Frontiers issued an explicit statement on values 
transmission through science. The report authors named the 
scientific values of rationality, transparency, and universality, 
asserting that “science provides a non-ideological environment for 
the participation and free exchange of ideas between people, 
regardless of cultural, national or religious backgrounds” (The 
Royal Society, 2010, vi). The InterAcademy Council, a broad-based 
international scientific organization representing ninety of the 
world’s science academies, had earlier affirmed the universality of 
scientific values in its study titled Inventing a Better Future, 
published January 30, 2004 (InterAcademy Council, 2004). 
Chaired by then President of the U.S. National Academy of 
Sciences Bruce Alberts and former President of the Indian National 
Science Academy Goverdhan Mehta, the report asserted, “The 
culture of science and the open, honest values that it engenders are 
enormously important above and beyond the material benefits that 
they help produce for human welfare” (InterAcademy Council, 
2004, 1). Science had achieved broad acceptance through the 
development of experimental methods and symbolic languages that 
allow it to cross linguistic barriers, enabling individuals from 
diverse cultural contexts to share ways of observing, analyzing, 
describing, and interpreting natural phenomena (InterAcademy 
Council, 2004, 30). 
The conclusions and recommendations of the New Frontiers 
and Inventing a Better Future reports embody three general 
premises that help explain why the Obama Administration favored 
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science diplomacy as a strategy to repair America’s image and 
improve U.S. relations with the Muslim world. First, science 
diplomacy is a relational strategy of engagement, befitting the 
scientist’s modus operandi of merit, peer review, objectivity, and 
transparency. Relational strategies address how countries and 
peoples interact with each other and how the international system 
itself is structured and managed. People engage each other as 
equals rather than as influencer and influenced, each possessing the 
capacity and will to change opinions, attitudes, and behaviors 
(Fitzpatrick, 2013, 33). 
Second, science diplomacy is as much a constitutive as a 
persuasive force, a fact that is better understood if we blur the 
grammatical boundaries established by the New Frontiers report. 
Science in diplomacy privileges individual expertise, autonomy 
from decision-makers, and objectivity toward the context in which 
decisions are made. Solid, evidence-based advice plus competent, 
good governance will yield material benefits. Science for diplomacy 
privileges authenticity, individual risk-taking, and activism guided 
by a personal ethos as well as socially held values. 
Dissolving this grammatical categorization creates a new 
premise, namely, that honest engagement plus transparency plus 
concerted social action will strengthen relations. Science diplomacy 
provides rhetorical resources to scientists seeking to enter the 
public sphere and exercise their voice, individually and collectively 
(Watts, 2001). These resources, available to all parties as co-arguers 
or co-creators of a narrative (Brockriede, 1972, 10), include one’s 
culture, familial and social relations, values (as enacted), 
institutions (as progenitors and keepers of traditions), and 
historical memory. Participants in science diplomacy give and 
return these resources, engendering mutual ownership in a 
successful exchange and its cascading benefits. 
Third, science diplomacy is not exclusive to nation states. 
Technological prowess, educational attainment, and economic 
growth have subsumed geography, population, and raw materials 
as indicators of national standing in global affairs (Nye 1990a, 179). 
Nation-states can no longer claim exclusive control over the 
resources of international influence. These new resources ease non-
traditional actors’ entrance onto the diplomatic stage, including 
media editors and other cue-givers, private sector corporations, 
non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, 
and networks of scientific communities (Nye, 2008, 100). These 
new actors have democratized science diplomacy, offering critical 
assessment of the economic and ecological dimensions of global 
security (Nye, 1990b, 157). 
M. Karen Walker 7 Poroi 11,2 (December 2015) 
PROMOTING MORE THAN AN AGENDA: THE 
ARENA OF OFFICIAL DISCOURSE 
Modern liberalism provides the core ideology of the Cairo Agenda 
program and official discourses. One hears in the discourse two key 
tenets of modern liberalism: faith in reason, which promotes 
science as a salve for social ills, and a free and fair playing field 
achieved by leveling up those who are disadvantaged (Lee, 1995, 
45). This ideological underpinning for the Cairo Agenda is 
consistent with President Obama’s rhetoric and his signature 
“journey” metaphor in particular; its telos toward equality of 
opportunity and justice valorizes America’s presumed path of 
upward mobility (Darsey, 2009, 92-94). 
As an expression of modern liberalism, the Cairo Agenda and 
associated discourses fit well within the tradition of American 
grand strategy, placing America’s engagement in foreign affairs in 
service to a mission: the spread of equality, justice, and opportunity 
encapsulated in a message of progress (Stuckey, 1995, 223). When 
placed in the context of President Obama’s early foreign policy 
addresses, progress is instrumental to peace building, effectuating 
America’s reconciliation with its own past and the community of 
nations (Ivie, 2011, 727). The Cairo address presented an 
ecumenical call to perform good works and live together in peace. It 
contributed to the President’s public persona as “a prudent 
visionary patiently seeking true peace” (Ivie, 2011, 738). 
The Cairo Agenda is a program of action in education, science, 
technology, and innovation to build trust between Muslim-majority 
countries and the United States, announced in President Obama’s 
“New Beginning” speech at Cairo University on June 4, 2009. The 
Cairo Agenda also committed the Administration to enhance 
science diplomacy programs with Muslim-majority countries. 
Beyond this specific aim, the Cairo Agenda speech placed science 
diplomacy within a larger context of international development and 
capacity-building programs, including but not necessarily limited to 
education reform, public health, entrepreneurship, and economic 
growth (Campbell, 2015, 27). In short, the Cairo Agenda functioned 
as a strategy for building partnerships to manage intractable 
problems and interdependent interests.  
To view the speech only in terms of diplomatic strategy, 
however, leaves the full meaning of the President’s words 
unexplored and its rhetorical force unexplained. The “New 
Beginning” speech extended an argument from the President’s 
campaign speeches and first inaugural address to the effect that 
religion and science—or more accurately, faith and reason—can co-
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exist. The “New Beginning” speech manifested the President’s 
pluralist impulse in seeking higher truths that are accessible to 
people of all faiths as well as to secularists and non-believers. 
Attendant to this claim, truth-seeking relies on dialectic and 
interrogation as the primary forms of argument—forms that are 
inherent in the practices and theologies of major faiths, including 
Christianity, Judaism, and Islam (Frank, 2011, 609–611). 
In keeping with Martin Medhurst’s identification of President 
Obama’s characteristic narrative signature, the President employed 
the dialectical method of dissociation, dividing two philosophies of 
knowing in a way that privileges science, and urges those addressed 
to apply reason as a test of worthiness (Medhurst, 2012, 200–201). 
Furthermore, the Cairo address employed, and subsequent 
discourses amplified, the grammatical elements of President 
Obama’s signature: the mythic and idealized pursuit of redemption 
and perfection, and public works that yield pragmatic, tangible, and 
measurable achievements (Medhurst, 2012, 196). 
In his “New Beginning” remarks, delivered at Cairo University 
on June 4, 2009, President Obama encouraged mutual recognition 
of Muslim and American contributions to learning and 
civilizational progress: 
For over a thousand years, Al-Azhar has stood as a 
beacon of Islamic learning; and for over a century, Cairo 
University has been a source of Egypt’s advancement. 
And together, you represent the harmony between 
tradition and progress. … Human progress cannot be 
denied. There need not be contradictions between 
development and tradition. Countries like Japan and 
South Korea grew their economies enormously while 
maintaining distinct cultures. The same is true for the 
astonishing progress within Muslim-majority countries 
from Kuala Lumpur to Dubai. In ancient times and in 
our times, Muslim communities have been at the 
forefront of innovation and education (Obama, 2009). 
In this opening, President Obama provides a number of narrative 
strands that tether subsequent discourses. For example, the image 
of the beacon taps into the light-dark metaphor that other 
participants in this discourse have invoked. In addition to the reach 
toward higher ideals and attainments, the metaphor’s inclusion in 
the Cairo speech opened additional meanings, including the pursuit 
of internal improvements and a sense of renewal (Osborn, 1967, 
122). 
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In contrast to the muted hue of the metaphor, the topos of 
progress is a vibrant strand. According to this topos, the subtext of 
neoliberalism, understood as “a relentless belief in the realization of 
the highest human potential,” belies a perspective rooted in 
American exceptionalism (Murea and Josan, 2014, 77). America 
has a moral obligation or duty to save the world from itself 
(Edwards and Weiss, 2011, 2). Because U.S. experience is in 
harmony with the natural order, nation-states following its example 
will share in freedom and prosperity (Heidt, 2013). By this logic, 
culture and tradition might not impede progress, but neither will 
they energize it. Advancements in science, the liberal arts, and 
material progress etch over past epochs’ social and cultural 
remnants (Murea and Josan, 2014, 77–78). 
The narrative strand of progress supports the President’s 
account of reclamation and recovery. In one section of the speech, 
the President acknowledges that 
It was innovation in Muslim communities that 
developed the order of algebra; our magnetic compass 
and tools of navigation; our mastery of pens and 
printing; our understanding of how disease spreads and 
how it can be healed. Islamic culture has given us 
majestic arches and soaring spires; timeless poetry and 
cherished music; elegant calligraphy and places of 
peaceful contemplation (Obama, 2009). 
This statement is then juxtaposed with the President’s claim that 
“the United States is one of the greatest sources of progress the 
world has ever known.” The innovations in Muslim communities 
may be an enduring, literally monumental, legacy, but the 
implication is that they exhausted their creative energy. In contrast 
to a reservoir that has been depleted and must be replenished, 
American genius is said to be a well spring of ideas and innovations 
that is self-perpetuating. 
Subsequent discourses by American officials extend this 
narrative of reclamation and recovery. Speaking at the Forum for 
the Future on November 3, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
said: 
It was the Islamic world that led the way in science and 
medicine. It was the Islamic world that paved the way 
for much of the technology and science that we now take 
for granted. And now we face global challenges … We 
want to look to your societies and we want to help 
Muslim majority communities develop the capacity to 
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meet economic, social and ecological challenges through 
science, technology, and innovation (Clinton, 2009). 
In Clinton’s narrative, innovation that drives progress is the United 
States’ gift to the Islamic world. This stance, as gift-giver, buttresses 
the United States’ superior position and leaves the recipients in the 
unenviable position of thanking the United States for their 
indebtedness. Clinton references problems that defy single-actor 
solutions, but Muslim-majority communities cannot join the 
United States in cooperative solutions because they are not up to 
the task. The relationship of giver and receiver negates attraction 
with obligation. 
Science envoy Rita Colwell’s commentary during her July 2011 
visit to Malaysia extended this recovery and reclamation narrative. 
Colwell observed that Malaysians have: 
a keen interest in education, a desire to stimulate 
innovation, creativity and for Malaysia to become a 
developed country in a given period of time. … There’s a 
history of mathematics and science that is rich in the 
Muslim world and I think that can be re-kindled through 
collaborations (Gomez, 2011). 
By choosing “re-kindled” to ascribe action, Colwell tapped into the 
rhetorical power of the light-dark metaphor. Light signifies the 
fundamental struggle for survival and development; with sight, one 
may escape danger, find profit, manipulate the environment, and 
enjoy warmth and sustenance. Colwell thus placed the United 
States in the role of bringer of light, the Malaysians’ protector 
(Osborn, 1967, 117). Re-kindling brings forth the twilight-to-dawn 
cycle of birth, death, and rebirth; the United States is not just a 
giver of light, but of life (Osborn, 1967, 121). Colwell thus inverted 
President Obama’s attempt to valorize the Islamic civilization’s 
curation of knowledge throughout the Dark Ages. 
Other envoys’ accounts placed the impetus, will, and capacity 
for scientific advancement in the hands of the Muslim communities 
with whom they were engaged, adjusting the narrative frame 
toward self-reliance. Science Envoy Bruce Alberts, for example, 
offered an alternative to those who placed the United States in a 
dominant position as bringer of gifts and light. Contrasting the 
“old” and “new” way of engaging with the developing world, Alberts 
said:  
In the past, the way we’ve thought about international 
help to developing countries has been too much based 
on ‘We’re going to help them fix the problem.’ But we 
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don’t fix the problem unless we give them the capacity to 
fix the problem themselves (Alberts, 2010). 
Alberts includes among his focus areas an effort to help science 
academies in other countries become more powerful entities for 
advising their governments, “for bringing the wisdom of science to 
their people” (Pellerin, 2010). Speaking more bluntly, Science 
Envoy Ahmed H. Zewail said that “although many Muslim 
countries possess a wealth of both human and natural resources, it 
is clear that a cultural rebirth is badly needed—Muslims are 
ultimately responsible for their own destiny” (Zewail, 2010).  
The self-reliance frame opens the possibility of 
consubstantiating U.S. and Muslim participants in the value of 
merit or meritocracy as a particular way of practicing science. This 
framing resonates with American notions of progress without the 
overt hierarchy of gift-giver and bringer of light. Regrettably, 
however, the narrative strand of self-reliance is too short to change 
the quality and telos of the progress narrative into a discourse in 
which all could participate on equal terms.  
The narrative of progress draws on a vocabulary of material 
production. In her remarks at the U.S.-Islamic World Forum on 
February 14, 2010, Secretary Clinton reaffirmed that the United 
States possesses the means of producing knowledge: 
President Obama and I believe that education and 
innovation are the currency of this century. That’s why 
he announced a new era of engagement with Muslim 
communities to expand educational opportunities, 
support entrepreneurs, and promote advances in science 
and technology. Our goal is to identify excellent ideas 
and successful projects in Muslim communities and then 
invest in them, help to scale them up, and to connect 
innovators and entrepreneurs, so that they can support 
and enhance each other’s work (Clinton 2010). 
By describing the United States as an investor, Clinton makes an 
ownership claim in Muslim-majority countries’ indigenous 
production of knowledge. In the words of Zewail, “Preserving 
knowledge is easy. Transferring knowledge is also easy. But making 
new knowledge is neither easy nor profitable—in the short term. It 
has, however, proved to be hugely profitable in the long run” 
(Zewail, 2011, 40). In Clinton’s account, the U.S. discovers and 
extracts ideas as the raw material of knowledge production and 
manages the value chain. The pay-off is immediate; the distribution 
of profits, ambiguous. 
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This narrative of production was simultaneously shared and 
contested, as one can hear in the account of Princess Sumaya bint 
El Hassan, President of the Royal Scientific Society of Jordan: 
In our modern and mismanaged world, so many of the 
benefits of scientific achievements have been limited to a 
comfortable minority of our global population—to the 
wealthier nations and to the elites of the developing 
world. Perhaps more worryingly, the development of 
scientific knowledge is also being hampered by short-
term economic interests. Developing nations—some with 
more power than others—must challenge notions of the 
‘ownership’ of science. Should our greatest innovative 
tool belong to a narrow echelon of the vast global 
population, or instead applied to achieve global goals 
that could improve the lives of millions and bring 
stability and security to our planet? (El Hassan, 2011). 
Princess Sumaya co-opted the vocabulary of production, but shifted 
the focus away from actors who exploit indigenous knowledge to a 
“modern and mismanaged world” in which such behavior is 
permissible and unanswered. The division between haves and have-
nots is woven into her account, its rectification serving as a 
motivating force for community action. The change in perspective, 
emphasizing the scene in which nation-states engage each other—as 
opposed to finding fault with the actors or their actions—changes 
the meaning of ownership from possession to stewardship. 
Interests are converted into purposes. This change in perspective 
transforms knowledge from an inert substance into a rhetorical 
resource for social agency. 
Let us sum up. The narrative of progress contained in the 
President’s “New Beginning” speech framed the Cairo Agenda as a 
recovery project and an engine for economic growth. The sub-
current of liberalism, however, keeps the United States in a position 
of influence over Muslim-majority countries and thus frustrates 
attempts to deepen identification. Contestation is the predominant 
mode of interaction between Western, Muslim, Arab, and hybrid 
voices. Muslim rhetors co-opt the vocabulary of production and re-
contextualize progress in ways that reduce dependency, but only in 
a defensive rather than constitutive move. 
The Cairo Agenda address performed rhetorical work in two 
registers. When contextualized in the Obama Administration’s 
message to the Arab and Muslim world, it advanced the President’s 
pursuit of reconciliation and further ingrained his mythos of 
human progress as a progression toward peace (Ivie, 2011, 738). 
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The Cairo speech and the discourses it inspired envision science as 
doing things. By reconciling faith and reason, science would 
reclaim its rightful place in service to economic growth.  
The dominant discourses within the official public sphere 
suggest a perspective that is outward facing—to change others 
attitudes and behaviors—and downward looking, with concern for 
material conditions. As we will hear in the next section, the 
discourses that illustrate the Muslim science public sphere adopt a 
perspective that, by contrast, is introspective and inclined to cast its 
gaze upward and in which self-reflection reinvigorates one’s 
striving toward redemption and perfection. 
PROMOTING MUSLIM SCIENCE: A COMMUNITY 
ENCLAVED BUT ENGAGED 
The discursive arena in which questions of Muslim science are 
debated may be characterized as an enclave. Participants are bound 
to each other through a set of shared assumptions and 
identifications that motivate action (Lynch, 2006, 36). Their 
discourse generates a “hidden transcript,” which conveys an 
alternate interpretation of political structures and relations that as 
yet cannot be generally aired or openly practiced (Lynch, 2006, 57). 
Accordingly, when discourses taking place within the Muslim 
science arena are introduced to other communities and amplified in 
widely accessible media, we must acknowledge that the discourses 
we see and hear are but fragments of that transcript. 
Moreover, the solidarity of member’s shared assumptions does 
not guarantee consensus. Rather, the public sphere of Muslim 
Science reflects the dynamics described by Lynch with regard to the 
Arab public sphere. Generally it is “deeply riven with intense 
disagreements” (Lynch, 2006, 35). In contrast to the Arab public 
sphere, in which these disagreements lead to discourses that push 
individuals from the center to the periphery and toward more 
extreme views, the individuals in dialogue about Muslim science 
present a conversation that is civic-minded and deliberative. The 
conversation reflects an effort to renegotiate personal and collective 
approaches to religious and civic practices, and to “re-
intellectualize” Muslim science in terms that are emotive, 
accessible, and experiential (Cesari, 2004, 92; Eickelman and 
Anderson, 2003, 12–13). 
In this section I highlight fragments of the conversation among 
Muslims about science. I have selected the fragments to illustrate 
the breadth of values that emerged in narrative accounts on what it 
means to be a scientist and to practice science. The fragments 
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suggest that diplomacy has the capacity to enjoin Western and 
Muslim scientists in a dialectic of faith and reason. Whereas the 
Cairo agenda discourses imbued science with agency to achieve 
economic growth, the Muslim science discourses infuse science 
with social purpose. It is possible that the discourses on Muslim 
science can successfully resolve the dialectic through an alternative 
ethos and reconstituted meaning of progress. This ethos, in turn, 
may be the lattice connecting the official Cairo Agenda and Muslim 
science arenas.  
The first fragment I have selected emphasizes empiricism: 
Science has, indeed, reshaped our thoughts and has 
developed progressive societies. From curing various 
ailments to building rockets for exploring the universe, 
we see fruits of science everywhere. I want to study 
science because I want to progress. I want to seek the 
truth of reality. I want to know how the universe really 
works. I want to rule out myths and superstitions, that 
mask the face of true evidences. I believe that instead of 
worrying about what flaws are there in our society, I 
need to focus on correcting myself. It is science that 
gives me the tools of skepticism and empiricism to do so 
(Arslan, 2014). 
This fragment introduces meanings invoked by the word “progress” 
as an ongoing struggle to improve not a nation or a community or 
an economy, but oneself. Empiricism answers the known unknowns 
about the world. For the empiricist, understanding oneself is a 
categorically separate domain or discipline. In the fragment above, 
the individual is a part of God’s creation. Knowledge of oneself and 
knowledge of the external world are inextricably and indelibly 
linked. 
The next fragment suggests that the scientific ethos is spiritual: 
Cooperation at the international level is desired for 
scientific investigations by Eastern societies and these 
investigations demand a link between the physical and 
spiritual spheres. A critical analysis of Muslim history 
reveals that most of Muslim scientists and scholars of 
the golden era were also eminent scholars of Islam and 
theology. An approach to supplicate thinking with 
spirituality is required, in order to influence scientific 
learning in Muslim societies (Iftikhar, 2014). 
The word “supplicate” belies this writer’s perspective with its 
implied relationship between material and spiritual inquiry. The 
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link between the physical and spiritual spheres is, however, 
ambiguous with respect to their relative position. The claim that 
Muslim scientists and scholars were also eminent scholars of Islam 
and theology suggests that the two spheres sit side by side, a 
grammar of “both/and” in which two opposing halves are perfectly 
conjoined, but in a way more characteristic of the past than the 
present. The third reference, to supplicate thinking with 
spirituality, elevates the latter and humbles the former. Empiricism 
cannot unlock the most important mysteries. 
In a third fragment empiricism and spirituality are reconciled in 
notions of a community empowered to act: 
Sciences are always enmeshed with social structures and 
political power. For knowledge always works to 
consolidate Power, and the latter, in its turn, always 
strives to produce systems of knowledge. Therefore, as 
Muslim believers, we must learn to be the producers of 
knowledge, not the consumers of imported knowledge, 
we will hold possession, not of definite truths, but of the 
discourse over the facts of Nature and existence. And 
yes, this is the POWER in developing sciences; it’s the 
ability to enforce a worldview which is in intelligent 
harmony with one’s faith and culture (Guendouzi, 2014). 
This scientific ethos recasts knowledge away from one’s ability to 
access and interpret epistemic materials, toward one’s ability to 
respond appropriately to problems through the exercise of one’s 
voice (Majdik and Keith, 2011, 371–373). The passage suggests a 
reconciliatory move by objectifying the locus of difference and 
conflict. Systems of knowledge—rather than people who hold 
beliefs or the doctrines they uphold—are placed in contestation. 
Accordingly, individuals of differing beliefs can engage with 
questions of whether and how systems of knowledge production 
may be reformed. The participants to discussion draw upon shared 
and unique rhetorical resources, including their values, culture, and 
institutions, to justify their proposed reforms. The key is that the 
rationale for reform is contingent upon and constituted through 
discourse. 
In addition to the productive tension between empiricism and 
spirituality, other fragments reconcile pragmatism and idealism in 
an agenda for reform: 
If we really want the Muslim societies to progress in 
science, we need to follow the principles of unity, faith 
and discipline, with education and a platform being 
available to each individual and child irrespective of 
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gender, race or financial status. If all the Muslim 
countries work together they can move towards a more 
bright future where the Muslims are in a more powerful 
position in the world (Noorani, 2014). 
This fragment invokes unity, faith, and discipline as ideals. It 
conveys an egalitarian impulse to affirm equal opportunity. 
Nonetheless, this move supports a bottom-line approach to 
identifying a problem, targeting its cause, and proposing a solution, 
in this case greater access to education. 
Ultimately, the espousal of an alternative set of values has the 
potential to integrate the physical and spiritual spheres in a 
scientific ethos centered on humankind’s relationship to nature, 
transcending the division of faith and reason: 
The global food system is a behemoth that connects 
every single human being on this planet. There are few 
human constructions that can boast of such an 
achievement. Each decision made on where one shops 
for food, what diet they follow and what happens to the 
smallest scrap of food waste, has an effect on this 
system. The Muslim world has the opportunity to 
shoulder some of the responsibility to ensure that it 
functions to the best of its ability, for the good of the 
planet and all of mankind. And when it comes to matters 
of everyday essentials, of something as intimately 
relevant and viscerally profound as food, no challenge is 
too big, or, opportunity too small (Hasnain, 2014). 
In keeping with the empowerment theme, this fragment addresses 
the relationship through the lens of individual choice. The account 
places the individual—whether a consumer whose consciousness is 
raised or a budding scientist who wants to make a difference—
within a global scene of production. The connection between local 
to global is mirrored in the connection of pragmatic action to 
idealist purposes. 
The final fragment projects an ethos centered on humankind’s 
relationship with nature into the existential realm: 
Revelation is not the source of scientific inquiry, it is the 
source of ethics and in order to apply those values to the 
scientific enterprise, it is necessary that the metaphysical 
recognition of the existence of divine entity, together 
with the axiological ethics put science to the service of 
humanity, instead of nature to the service of capitalism, 
materialism, and consumerism. The most important 
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factor in promoting creativity and innovation within the 
Muslim societies, is by inculcating the principle of 
moderation in the scientific enterprise. Thus, Islamic 
moderation must promote the accountability and 
responsibility of man towards nature as a sign and 
manifestation of the creator of the universe, removing 
the ego of modern man denying the creator and 
divinizing the domination of reason over revelation, by 
claiming that the scientific enterprise can deliver 
absolute truths (Fortich, 2014). 
This fragment adopts an attitude of self-restraint and humility. The 
principle of moderation applies to the conduct of science; creativity 
and innovation occur naturally when science is unadulterated by 
human ambition. When members of the scientific enterprise enact 
the altruistic ideal of serving humanity, they reject the narrative of 
economically-tinged progress that was established in President 
Obama’s “New Beginning” speech and subsequent discourses. To be 
a scientist is to struggle against one’s base impulses while 
contributing to the discovery of larger truths. 
What we hear in these discourses is a community in the making. 
Reason and spirituality represent mutually related and interacting 
perspectives (Burke, 1969, 503). The voices emerging from within 
the Muslim science public sphere affirm in an ideational or 
symbolic sense what it means to be a scientist and to conduct 
science in a cross-cultural and humanistic context (Burke, 1969, 
511). As such, they are not fully in harmony with Obama’s 
approach. And yet there remains a sufficient degree of ambiguity 
and un-finishedness to allow rhetoric to perform its work. 
THE EMERGING ETHOS IS PROPHETIC 
As we have heard in the fragments just presented, for Muslim 
scientists a new ethos must emerge if the scientist is to adopt the 
attitude of a reformer. This impetus toward reform is not far 
removed from the narrative of progress that emerged from official 
discourses. Each discursive arena, therefore, is attuned to calls for 
introspection and renewal. In this regard, participants in both 
arenas exercise the prophetic voice. 
By employing this term, I borrow heavily from the research 
Lynda Walsh published in Scientists as Prophets: A Rhetorical 
Genealogy (Walsh, 2013). Walsh’s work provides a number of 
markers of the prophetic voice that appear in the discourses I have 
gathered for my critique. The prophetic voice embraces dialectic 
and exercises judgment; an individual claims his or her right to 
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speak, raises a warning based on the interpretation of signs, issues 
a judgment (a promise or a threat) that rests on a shared covenant 
or values, and mediates others’ responses until the crisis passes 
(Walsh, 2013, 9–10, 35). 
Prophecy is in this connection a communal act. Recognition of 
the warning signs and concurrence with the judgment are necessary 
to the process; that is, witnesses are required to vouch for such a 
claim (Walsh, 2013, 84). Further, prophecy concerns itself with 
questions that form the crux of the emerging scientific ethos: how 
to resolve problems that arise when we try to define our knowledge, 
our society, and relationships between them, and how to live with 
each other and in the world (Walsh, 2013, 83). 
Among the characteristics Walsh identifies, the responsibility of 
raising others’ awareness to danger appears most clearly and 
consistently in the discourses critiqued. For founder of Muslim-
Science.com, Athar Osama, that danger is isolation. From Osama’s 
perspective, the developed world will maintain its gravitational pull 
on knowledge production. The division between haves and have-
nots is less likely to be evened out and more likely to result in 
winner-take-all, leaving Muslim scientists and innovators as well as 
their beneficiaries to continue their striving in isolation: “For the 
developing world in general, and the Islamic World in particular, 
this could mean the loss of a significant economic opportunity. 
Thus it is all the more important, even if the more difficult, for 
Islamic countries to create a knowledge economy before they are 
bypassed” (Osama, 2012). Osama conveys a sense of urgency of 
acting before the tipping point is reached. The appeal to kairos is 
very pronounced in his writings. 
The sense of isolation also becomes poignant when future 
prospects are set within the expanse of time, as expressed by Datuk 
Dr. Zakri Abdul Hamid, Science Advisor to Malaysia’s Prime 
Minister, on the occasion of President Obama’s May 2014 state 
visit: 
The “Golden Age of Islamic Civilsation” referred to by 
Obama lasted about 1,000 years—from the 7th to the 17th 
century—and spanned a territory from southern Spain to 
China. Sadly, the 67 Muslim-majority member countries 
of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation are among 
the poorest in the world today and lag behind in science, 
technology, and innovation, the engine that drives 
prosperity (Hamid, 2014). 
Hamid conveys a deep sense of loss and regret in this passage. 
Muslim-majority countries shared a civilizational covenant that has 
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been broken, and for which a multi-lateral organization provides a 
poor substitute. 
Accounts vary on how the covenant was broken. Still, 
participants in this discourse demonstrate an impetus for self-
reflection:  
To change the world for the better, we have to change 
ourselves. I can talk about peace but for that I have to be 
at peace with myself first. Finding your inner wealth and 
fighting your inner poverty is extremely important. 
Poverty you see on the streets is external poverty. 
Corruption is internal poverty. We need to address that. 
As long as you have corruption and greed, you are not 
going to change. If the mindset is poor, the work that 
those people are doing will also be affected. And that’s 
bad for development (Amadei, 2014). 
This account, taken from Science Envoy Bernard Amadei, 
emphasizes the personal struggle to avoid temptation and to 
eschew the quest for personal gain that blinds oneself to others’ 
despair. To go through the struggle is also to strive to improve the 
human condition, and ultimately, an act of altruism. 
The personal corruption of which Amadei spoke has deep roots 
and long-term, systemic consequences, described by 
MuslimScience.com essayist Dr. Yarub Al-Douri: 
It would be a gross mistake to single out religious 
conservatism alone for the lack of scientific progress in 
the Islamic world. Far more telling are the antiquated 
administrative and bureaucratic systems that many 
Islamic countries inherited from their colonial occupiers 
and that have still not been replaced due to a chronic 
lack of political will to reform, tackle corruption, and 
overhaul failing educational systems and institutions 
(Al-Douri, 2014). 
How one interprets Al-Douri’s account depends in part on one’s 
entry point and the emphasis one gives to the chain of consequence 
stemming from colonial rule. My reading is that corruption saps 
both the personal and political will to reform. The source of 
redemption remains internal to the community, an admonishment 
issued by Princess Sumaya: “We Arabs have a demon within us who 
calls for the biggest and the brightest, a demon that appeals to us to 
build an edifice that will put the neighbours in the shade. 
Unfortunately, we do little to work together” (El Hassan, 2010).  
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With introspection comes the future promise of scientific 
advancement for the greater good. Rashid Iftikhar, writing for 
Muslim-Science.com, expresses the hope that: 
The Muslim world will again flourish in the near future, 
as science and technology are now believed to be 
potential ingredients for a nation’s progress. Economic 
globalization is dispersing western technologies 
throughout the east, promoting unprecedented science 
ideology. Eastern governments have realized the 
importance of science directed efforts towards economic 
welfare and attempts are being made to develop research 
capabilities, through wide research policies 
implementation and research cooperation between 
private and government sectors. Although the scientific 
future of Muslim world will be on the rise, but this does 
not guarantee the return of the golden era (Iftikhar, 
2014). 
Iftikhar reclaims progress not as a binary between culture and 
tradition but as a natural outgrowth of the diffusion of knowledge 
and research collaboration. He proclaims a re-awakening. It is a re-
awakening with full cognizance of past faults that could again 
prevent the inhabitants of the Islamic world from achieving their 
destiny. 
I assert that these accounts work collectively to motivate 
Muslim-majority countries toward reform, constructing an 
affirming parable of redemption, promise, and progress. The people 
are on a righteous path toward discovery. They have made a 
covenant to enlighten the world with their knowledge and science. 
Blinded by short-sightedness, envy, inequality, and corruption, they 
have experienced a fall, isolated and impoverished. The fall is to be 
followed by a period of introspection and re-commitment, leading 
ultimately to a reclamation encompasses far more than economic 
standing. 
PARTING THOUGHTS 
I have delved into the discourses generated by and associated with 
the Cairo Agenda in order to assess science diplomacy’s capacity to 
open borders between two discourse communities. I find that 
discourses emanating from the “New Beginning” are limited in their 
rhetorical force. The narrative of recovery entails commitment to a 
conception of progress that was unilaterally developed and 
pronounced, not co-constructed. President Obama’s New Beginning 
speech contained the potentiality for subsequent speakers to 
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amplify his foreign policy vision of peace and reconciliation. 
Instead, the narratives presented by Obama’s surrogates functioned 
metonymically, reducing progress to a singular meaning of material 
production. The narrative of production maintains a hierarchy that 
reaffirms the United States’ place of privilege and keeps Muslim-
majority countries in a state of dependency. Efforts to redirect the 
narrative of progress toward self-reliance and resilience may falter 
still. 
Through venues such as Muslim-Science.com and the entrée to 
U.S. officials afforded by the science diplomacy initiatives I have 
discussed, Muslim scientists now have a platform from which to 
agitate for reform. The Muslim voices partaking in the call to 
community imbue scientific discovery with an ethical purpose that 
melds humanism and spirituality in ways that contrast with how 
the west deals with these themes (topoi). This finding raises doubt 
about science diplomacy’s capacity to forge or repair nation-state 
relations absent the pursuit of tangible outcomes. 
An implication is that categorical definitions of science 
diplomacy may have run their course. An integrative framework 
that functions synecdochally may be more desirable. A framework 
that connects cross-cultural engagement with actions and outcomes 
responds to the impetus for reform. That is, engagement strategies 
(science for diplomacy) and strategies to build capacity and 
improve the human condition (science in diplomacy) are 
interdependent and share the same qualities. A discourse that 
replaces “science in” and “science for” with “science through” 
diplomacy generates opportunities to influence relations and enact 
one’s values through practice. 
In conclusion, one might hope that the dialectics of empiricism 
and spirituality, pragmatism and idealism, and faith and reason will 
be reconciled in a purpose-driven narrative of service and 
stewardship. An activist, ethos-driven engagement with others and 
the world will create and share new knowledge. This knowledge, in 
turn, may generate an understanding of the natural forces affecting 
our planet and the cosmos, and yields social benefits for global 
health, sustainable livelihoods, and human security. 
This nascent scientific ethos converts the impetus for reform 
into the performance of public works. This conversion encapsulates 
the rhetorical work of science diplomacy: to reinterpret progress in 
the Cairo Agenda in ways that conform more closely to President 
Obama’s foreign policy vision of peace and reconciliation; to 
generate narratives that catalyze and celebrate these good works; 
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and to craft from these narratives a lattice connecting official (U.S. 
diplomacy) and reticulate (Muslim science) public spheres. 
Service and stewardship contain a vast store of rhetorical 
meanings and symbolic resources to motivate the crossing of 
cultural boundaries and discursive arenas. Each dialectic draws on 
qualities that are intrinsic, situational, and social. Reconciliation of 
perspectives occurs when we leave the realm of the ideational for 
the realm of action. Service and stewardship animate covenant 
values as authentic expressions of the prophetic voice. 
And I end with a parting thought why science diplomacy 
matters: 
We are the people who both love and fear science; we are 
the people who value industry and capital and yet want 
our natural environment to remain pristine; we are the 
people who prize solidarity and yet cannot bring 
ourselves to silence the voices speaking from the margin. 
And so, although our science advisers cannot tell the 
future or tell us what to do, they do—and will continue 
to—help us to know ourselves (Walsh, 2013, 198). 
Copyright © 2015 M. Karen Walker  
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